Friday, September 13, 2013

The Myth of Early-detection: Advances in Treatment--- not Screening Mammography--- Probably Account for Decline in Breast Cancer Mortality Rates, 1963-2013

Part 1----Screening Mammography/Early Detection

                I became skeptical of the early-detection hypothesis a few years ago when I heard a cancer expert confess that no one knows “the natural history” of breast cancer, i.e., that we don’t completely understand how breast cancers develop and change. We’re not sure when they first occur, why the smallest that can be detected has already metastasized or how some shrivel up and disappear on their own. Apparently, for the past 50 years, we’ve naively assumed breast cancers develop like everything else.

                Hoping it might help determine whether the early detection hypothesis had any validity, I reviewed the history of screening mammography beginning with the first screening trial 50 years ago. Below I’ve summarized the (1) trials and studies, (2) mammography innovations and (3) the most recent research on the risk of ionizing radiation I’ve reviewed. I’ve also inserted (in italics) my experience as a breast cancer patient wherever I thought it might be useful.
   
The 1960s

                The First Trial of Mammography Screening: The Health Insurance Plan (HIP) Trial (1963-1986)1 was inspired by Dr. Michael Shimkin, a researcher and bio-ethicist at the National Cancer Institute.  He was interested in a brand-new mammography technology developed by Dr. Robert Egan, one of the “fathers of modern mammography.” The HIP trial was the first randomized-controlled trial of mammography screening. Unfortunately, it appears to have also been the last.

                In its simplest form, a randomized-control trial compares a study vs. a control group. In the HIP trial, women in the study group were screened; those in the control group weren’t. When the two groups are well-matched, any differences found between them may be attributed to differences in how the study group and the control group were treated.

                The HIP researchers’ access to the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York2 enabled them to match each woman in the screening group to a woman in the control group who was the same age, had the same number of children, had the same family income, and lived and/or worked in the same Greater New York Area. The two women weren’t twins or siblings, but they very well-matched neighbors. Approximately 30,000 women between the ages of 40 and 64 were assigned to each group.

                Women in the study group were screened by both mammography and clinical breast examination (palpation). They were expected to attend an initial screening followed by three yearly re-examinations.

                The women in the control group were left to follow their usual medical practices. Since mammography for asymptomatic breast cancer was not a HIP benefit, it was unlikely that any of them were screened.

                In spite of the researchers’ efforts, only 8,060 women completed all four screenings. Ten thousand women in the study group didn’t attend the initial screening (the refusers) and another 11,940 didn’t return for one or more of the three yearly examinations.

                The refusers were an interesting group. They carried a greater burden of other diseases and fewer of them than the other women in the control group developed and died breast cancer.

                The HIP Trial Results: (1) Five percent fewer breast cancer deaths occurred among the screened than the unscreened women. It’s unclear however, whether the lower rate of breast cancer mortality was due to screening. It could have been due to differences in treatment.

                (2)  Ten percent more of the screened than unscreened women were treated with a radical mastectomy. The difference is large enough to account for the observed difference in breast cancer deaths. Apparently, the authors of the study didn’t notice.

                (3)  The evidence for early detection was meager: screened women (1) were less likely to have traces of breast cancer cells in the lymph nodes under their adjacent armpit and (2) 0.1% fewer had invasive breast cancers. Plus, no data analyses comparing the mortality data for these subgroups of women were done.

                 And, (4) ten years after having been first screened, a greater proportion of 40-49 year-old women in the screening group than the control group died of their breast cancer. Eighteen years after, most of the 5% difference in mortality rate occurred in women whose breast cancers were detected after the “women had passed their 50th birthday.”

                What Can Be Concluded: (1) Screening did not benefit women in their 40s, (2) many women saw no advantage in being screened for breast cancer, and (3) the authors overlooked the possible effect of treatment on mortality.

The 1970s

                In 1972, the American Cancer Society began its Breast Cancer Detection Demonstration Project. The Project was supposedly based on the “success” of the HIP trial, yet the Society rejected a randomized-controlled trial and decided in favor of a demonstration project3.

                 It wanted to demonstrate: (1) that “early detection cures cancer” and (2) that large numbers of women, particularly those in their 30s and 40s, could be enticed to be screened. In addition, it needed to raise enough money to continue to exist3.

                The Project was a joint endeavor of the Society and the National Cancer Institute.  The Society set the agenda and the National Cancer Institute contributed over $6 million a year. Twenty-nine detection centers were created and the media was extensively used to attract 270,000 volunteers between the ages of 35 and 74. Chaos ensued.

                In response to the well-publicized breast cancer experiences of Happy Rockefeller and Betty Ford, so many women in their 30s and 40s volunteered, they made up half of the women in the Project. When news about the dangers of ionizing radiation appeared during the Project’s early years, women refused to complete the required five screening sessions. Later they reenrolled after hearing the Society had replaced the more dangerous machines.  And, when the media reported that a pathologist reviewing pathology reports had discovered that 66 women were misdiagnosed (perhaps the first known incidence of over-diagnosis), women again stopped enrolling.

                Although only asymptomatic women were eligible, 6% had lumps in their breasts, 18% had had previous breast surgery, and 20% had had at least one mammogram prior to entry--- as many as 118,800 of the 270,000 volunteers could have been ineligible.  Furthermore, they did not represent women in the general population. Most were upper middle-class.

                Dr. Myles P. Cunningham, President of the Society in 1997, put the best spin on it he could when he claimed that “… the Project significantly advanced both the notion and the science of population-based breast cancer screening.4” In fact, the Project probably made it impossible to run a truly randomized control trial ever again. Given its wide use of the media, researchers could no longer “assign” women to a control group, i.e., to not be screened. The only options left were to either use volunteers or study the effects of breast cancer screening in already existing populations.
    
                What Can Be Concluded:  (1) Large numbers of women in their 30s and 40s could be enticed to be screened and (2) the Society succeeded in marketing itself and mammography screening. It raised the money it needed to continue to exist. Scientifically, its Project was a failure and probably restricted how future screening mammography research could be done.
                 
1980-2000

                The Canadian National Breast Screening Study-1 began In 19805.  Only women in their 40s were eligible. All 50,430 participants were volunteers.

                 I was one.

                We were told that we could be randomly assigned to either the screening group or the control group. So, each of us agreed to the possibility of not being screened.  After agreeing we were randomly assigned to either the screening or non-screening group: 25,214 to the screening group and 25,216, to the non-screening group.

                 I was assigned to the screening group.

                As in the HIP trial (1) women were screened by both mammography and a clinical breast examination; (2) women in the control group were expected to continue their normal pattern of medical care and (3) since mammography screening was not a benefit of Canada’s universal health plan at the time, it was unlikely that women in the non-screening group would be screened.  However, 1799 women (7.1%) in the screening group and 6655 (26.4%) in the non-screening group had one or more mammograms outside of the trial.

                The women in the non-screening group who had mammograms outside the trial differed. They had a greater risk of dying from breast cancer.

                 The Canadian Trial Results: (1) Screening did not benefit women in their 40s. Ten years after their first mammogram, more women in the screening groups than in the control group had died of breast cancer.  And, sixteen years after entry, 105 in the screening group and 108 in the non-screening group had died of breast cancer.
       
                (2) Again, no mortality data were provided for possible evidence of early detection. Seventy-one in situ breast cancers were detected in the screening group; 29, in the control group.

                And, (3) in the version of the trial I read, no mention was made of how the women with breast cancer were treated.

                What Can Be Concluded:  Again, (1) there was no reliable evidence that screening benefits women in their 40s and (2) a data analysis that could have shown a direct link between early detection and mortality was apparently not done, but twenty years after the HIP trial (3) many women now saw an advantage in being screened.
        
The 2000s

                Computer-aided detection (CAD) --- pattern recognition software that marks and brings suspicious-looking regions of mammograms to radiologists’ attention---was introduced in about 2004.6 CAD‘s design is based on the early-detection hypothesis.

                 Detecting anything that could possibly be a breast cancer as soon as possible becomes of utmost importance if it’s true that women will die when their breast cancers are not detected as early as possible.  CAD marks everything that might be suspicious. As a result, it produces an average of 167 to 500 false marks per 1000 mammograms.

                Radiologists using CAD find more breast cancers (many of which are minuscule) and make more false alarms. That’s fine if the early detection hypothesis is true; it’s not fine if it’s false. False positives and over-diagnoses ---diagnoses of breast cancer that would not have been diagnosed in woman’s lifetime if they had not been screened----reduce the quality of women’s lives.
                The anxiety and fear associated with false positives are not short-lived7.  Some women suffer from sleep disturbances and other symptoms of anxiety for as long as three years.  And, over-diagnosis, in addition to subjecting women to unnecessary treatment, leads to life-long recurring episodes of fear that the breast cancer will recur and metastasize, to say nothing about the depression that often accompanies breast cancer diagnoses.
                In 2009 the United States Preventative Services Task Force reviewed a large and varied set of trials and studies, assessed their reliability and validity and recommended (1) women in their 40s not initiate regular screening and (2) 50-74 year-old women be screened biennially and not annually. Their new recommendations attempt to minimize the harms of over-diagnosis and false positives while retaining the purported benefits of screening.
               
                What Can Be Concluded: In the 2000s, (1) a powerful imaging adjunct was developed that increased the risk of false positives and over-diagnosis and (2) the United States Preventative Services Task Force revised its guideline to minimize the potential harms of mammography.

2010-2012

                As far as I know, the Task Force did not take into account the possible harm of ionizing radiation. In 2010, an article containing estimates of the number of mammography-induced breast cancers and deaths due to repeated exposure of screening mammography’s low levels of ionizing radiation appeared in Radiology8. (An average glandular dose of 4.7 mGY per screening was assumed).
                The estimated risk is 0.91 per 1000 women for women screened annually from age 40 to 80. That’s high, almost 1 per 1000 women. If that were the risk for a drug, even if it were effective and saved women’s lives, it would be shunned by many patients and physicians.
                However if women wait until they’re 50 to initiate screening; the risk is reduced to 0.40 per 1000 women. And the risk of dying from a mammography-induced breast cancer is reduced from 0.25 to 0.12. That could mean that during their life-span, five of the 25,214 women in their 40s who were screened in the Canadian trial will develop a mammography-induced breast cancer, one or two of whom might die. Thus, while screening may have saved the lives of three women, it also may have endangered the lives of one or two others.*

                 In 2011, the Canadian Task Force on Preventive Care suggested that “No” was a legitimate response to mammography screening for women who (1)didn’t place a high value on the small chance that screening might save their lives and (2) were concerned about false-positive readings and over-diagnoses9.

                Professor Peter C. Goestzache, Director of the Nordic Cochrane Center, Rigshospitalet, Copenhagen, citing the results of Danish and Swedish mammography studies, suggested that “It may be most wise to avoid screening altogether, at any age”9, 10.

                In one large area of Denmark, screening was available for 17 years. In another, it wasn’t. The decline in mortality from breast cancer was greater (by 1%) in the area where screening was not available, suggesting that some breast cancers disappear. The authors estimated that a third of the women who had been screened were over-diagnosed.

                And, in fact, untreated cancers do sometimes simply disappear: When my bone metastases were detected, CT and bone scans showed that some of the lesions had completely healed even though I had had no treatment during the ten years between when my breast cancer was first detected in 1985 and its recurrence discovered in 1995.
                A group of Swedish women who had been screened for a period of six years were compared to a group who were not screened during the first four years of the same six-year period.  The accumulated number of breast cancers was lower in the group of women who were not screened for the initial four years ---yet more evidence that screening leads to over-diagnoses.
                In 2012, a study by Drs. A. Bleyer (Oregon Health and Science University in Portland) and H. Gilbert Welch (Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH) appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine showing that over the past 30 years, screening had: (1) failed to reduce the number of women walking around with late-stage breast cancer, something which should not have happened if early detection had worked as hypothesized and (2) led to 1.2 million women being over-diagnosed.
                However, EUROSCREEN, a cooperative group made up of experts who evaluated population-based screening programs in nine countries (France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Spain), estimated that the number (7-9 per 1000 women) of lives saved by breast cancer screening programs exceeded the risks of over-diagnoses (4 per 1000 women) and false positives (200 per 1000 women)11.
                The EUROSCREEN numbers however, are not relevant for the U.S. They’re based on biennial screening programs for women 50-69 years old, a much more efficient screening strategy than the one commonly used in the U.S.
                Furthermore, the estimated number of lives saved is probably too high. The EUROSCREEN estimates combined the reduction in mortality rate observed in case-control studies (48%) with the reduction in incidence based mortality rates (38%).  Case-control studies are notoriously biased and tend to be overly positive.
                What Can Be Concluded:  In the past three years, evidence of the harms of mammography screening---mammography-induced breast cancers, false alarms and over-diagnoses---has been rapidly accumulating.
Conclusion
                Over the past fifty years, screening research has overlooked the contribution of treatment to the reduction in rate of breast cancer mortality, even though, without effective treatments, screening and the early detection of breast cancers would be useless.
                Early detection may have been important when treatments were mostly ineffective. For example when mastectomy was the only treatment option (see the HIP trial results above). It might still be important for breast cancers for which the new targeted therapies are not effective. We don’t know.
                We do know however, that women in their 40s are still being urged to be screened even though they do not benefit from screening and are particularly vulnerable to ionizing radiation. Those data could not be clearer. And other, more recent, data indicate that large numbers of women of all ages have been needlessly exposed to the harms of false positives and over-diagnosis.
                Despite the consistent lack of evidence during the last fifty years, the hugely successful and persistent marketing of the myth behind mammography screening has drained our resources and distracted us from doing what we should have been doing----decoding the natural history of breast cancers. And that, I fear, may be its greatest harm.
References
* Since the 25,214 women were screened just five times between the ages of 40 and 49, the number of women who might develop a mammography-induced breast cancer is 6.3 (25,214 x 0.25). And the number who might die of that breast cancer is 1.575 women (6.3 x 0.25).
1Shapiro, S., Venet, H., Strax, P. & Venet, L., 1988, the Health Insurance Plan Project and Its Sequelae, 1963-1986. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
2The American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 35, June, 1945, pp. 643-644.
3Lerner, B.H., March, 2001, To See Today with the Eyes of Tomorrow: a History of Screening Mammography, A Background Paper for the Institute of Medicine report: “Mammography and Beyond: Developing Technologies for the Early Detection of Breast Cancer.”
4Cunningham, M.P. 1997, The Breast Cancer Detection Demonstration Project 25 Years Later, CA---A Cancer Journal for Clinicians, 47, 131-132.
6Zivian, M.T. & Gershater, R., 2008, The Accuracy of Diagnostic Radiology, in M. A. Hayat (ed.) Cancer Imagining Instrumentation and Applications, Vol. 2, Elsevier Academic Press, pp.109-118.
9Time to stop mammography screening, Canadian Medical Association Journal (2011), 183 (17), pp. 1957-58)
10British Medical Journal, October, 2012.

11Journal of Medical Screening, 2012, 9: 5-13.